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SUMMARY 
A study has been made of pilot human factors related to stall/spin accidents of supersonic fighter 
aircraft. The military specifications for flight at high angles of attack are examined. Several pilot 
human factors problems related to stall/spin are discussed. These problems include (1) unsatisfactory 
nonvisual warning cues; (2) the inability of the pilot to quickly determine if the aircraft is spinning 
out of control. or to recognize the type of spin; (3) the Inability of the pilot to decide on and implement 
the correct spin-recovery technique; (4) the inability of the pilot to move, caused by high angular rota-
tion: and (5) the tendency of pilots to wait too long in deciding to abandon the irrecoverable aircraft. 
Psycho-physiological phenomena influencing pilot's behavior in stall/spin situations Include (1) channeli-
zation of sensory inputs, (2) limitations in precisely controlling several muscular inputs, (3) inaccurate judgment of elapsed time, and (4) disorientation of vestibula-ocular Inputs. Results are given of pilot 
responses to all these problems in the F14A, F16/AB, and F/A-IBA aircraft. The use of departure/spin 
resistance and automatic spin prevention systems incorporated on 'recent supersonic fighters are discussed. 
These systems should help to improve the stall/spin accident record with some compromise In maneuverability. 
NOMENCLATURE 
ACM air combat maneuvering 
AOA angle of attack 
ARI aileron rudder interconnect 
c mean aerodYnamic chord 
C.G. center of gravity 
CAS command augmentation system 
CLmax maximum lift coefficient 
DFCS digital flight control system 
EBO eyeballs-out 
FCS flight control system 
HUD head-up display 
LEX leading-edge extension 
MIL SPEC military specifications 
MPO manual pitch override 
OVRD override 
~SS relaxed static stability 
SRI stick rudder interconnect 
1. INTRODUCTION " 
From man's earliest attempts at flight, stall/spin accidents have plagued the development of virtually 
all types of aircraft. Today, stall/spin accidents are still a serious problem for the military. The 
problem fs"a'Ccentuated for fighter aircraft by the need to operate at very high angles of attack for good 
air combat 'effectiveness. 
From the flight mechanics standpoint, the poor stall/spin accident record arises from a combination 
of several factors: (1) unfavorable aerodynamic (stability and damping) characteristics at high angle of 
attack (AOA) which cause the aircraft to depart from controlled flight, (2) adverse control-system featur~s 
which help "trigger" the spin entry. and (3) poor spin recovery characteristics caused by low control 
effectiveness. 
1 
:-
Although the'fundamental aerod;;;amic'parameters whic"h underlay the stall/spin problem are reasonably 
well understood and criteria have been developed to determine the susceptibility of a given configuratIon 
to departure and spin problems, the accident record for military fighter aircraft Is still unsatisfactory. 
Over 100 F-4 aircraft have been lost during the course of'development and operation due to out-of-control 
f1ight. the record is much improvedJor modern fighter aircraft such as the ~-14, ~-15 ~-16, and F-18; 
however, accidents have occurred from flight in the high'AOA range and these aircraft have yet to be 
exposed to broader ;operationa 1 use .. : . ' ::' 
~.: :' , . , . 
One can intuitively reason that another fundamental 'part of the stall/spin problem 15 the pilot's 
response'pattern under very demanding·and high-stress flight conditions. The pilot's role in controlling 
modern supersonic fighter aircraft has changed in that he has been exposed to new phenomena, ;uch as the 
deep stall, which were not included:in his training syllabus. The requirement-for a change in his mode of 
operation is due ,to several factors:' ',"(1) greater emphasis has been placed on multi-role aspects and'a 
diversity of external stores are carried, not only influencing high AOA aircraft behavior, but also 
demanding a greater versatility from the pilot to carry out hlS mission successfully; (2) wing planforms 
designed to provide 'good lift and maneuverability at very high (AOA) have a gradual stall progression with 
no sharp g break, thus depriving the pilot of natural stall warning cues; (3) the pilot's "feel" of the 
aircraft response is masked by the specialized augmentat~on control systems provided to lessen departure 
tendencies; (4) the classiC steep spin, typical of yesterday's subsonic fighters which required Simple 
recovery techniques (opposite rudder and forward stick) has changed in that modern aircraft may possess 
several spin modes requiring different control recovery techniques for each; and (5) the long slender fea-
tures of the supersonic configurations tend to place' the pilot farther from the C.G., resulting'in large 
accelerations when high yaw-rate spins occur. 
This paper reviews the pilot human factors peculiar to high AOA operation of current supersonic 
fighter aircraft. A clearer understanding of the pilot's, limitations and requirements under high stress 
situations could help improve the accident record. In turn, the aircraft could be designed to accommodate 
the pilot rather than requiring the pilot to fit the airplane. 
The scope of this paper includes the following: ' (1) a brief review of the military specifications (MIL SPEC) to point out the handling qualities required in the high AOA flight envelope, (2) a brief baCK-
ground of the peculiarities of human behavior under high stress Situations, and (3) an examination of the 
stall/spin characteristics of several modern supersonic.fighter aircraft to pinpoint those areas which 
affect pilot human factors in a manner, tending to cause·'accidents. 
2. BACKGROUND , ; 
2.1 Review of MIL SPEC for High AOA Handling Qualities Requirements 
The MIL SPEC requirements (Ref. 1) -'or flight at high AOA are examined briefly to clarify the expected 
behavior relative to stall/spin characteristics. Areas covered include stall warning, stalls, departures, 
post-stall gyrations, spins, recoveriesi ,and related characteristics. The requirements are intended to 
assure safety of flight and absence of,mission limitation~. 
, , 
. ;"arriing CUtiS. Warning or indication of appl'Oac~, to staZZ. loss of aizocrcft aontl'OZ. and incipient 
3pin shaLZ be olear and unambiguous. For many years the lack of adequate high AOA cues nas ranked high o~ 
the list of pilots' problems in air combat maneuvering, (ACM). Pilots desire natural cues that do not place 
an artificial limit on aircraft performance. As discussed' in Ref. 2, pilots in operational squadrons 
strongly objected to prevention of dangerous flight conditions by using maneuver limiters. Such devices 
are believed to make an aircraft's maneuvering performance predictable to the enemy. Admittedly, this 
requirement 15 difficult to quantify an,d relates very str~ngly to flight safety in a dangerous part of the 
flight envelope. Providing adequate warning cues may be only one solution to the problem. Another is to 
provide good aircraft characteristics such that the pilot'can maneuver without concern for loss of control 
due to stall, departure, or spin. '. 
'~ ..... 
3::dz characteristics. I'! unaaceZe;.ated staZZs the '~ituds of l..nc=andCld l'OZUr-'J, "a:.Ji",-'J. ::nd 
p~tching motions are Zeft to be definet:! by the pl'Oouring agsncy. In addition it is desired ;hat r., ~~;ch-up 
~"r..:i.mcies occur in unacceZerated flight; wevtir, mild- nosti-up tendencies ae pe~tted ~n acceZer-::.:ed 
:7.-i.gr!': if the optirational effeC1:itleness of ehs airpZane'is net compl'Omi3ed. Pi tch-up can occur from :nany 
causes (1.e., outer panel stall, inertial coupling, etc.);, and it continlles to be a difficult area for the 
pilot to cope with..., 
, Stal.t prevention and recovel"J. It; 'shatz. be poss':bl~, to prevent the atall by moderate use of =i~c!: 
~ontroZ alone at the onset of the stall ~arning. It shatt be possible to ~ecover ~om a stalZ au sir.p!e 
use of the pitoh, roZZ, and yau controls. In straight 'light stalZs ~i:oh controZ' ~ower 8r~ZZ ce Sk~~~­
:Ji,1nl: to recover from any :lttainable AOA.' The consequences of inadequate pi tch control on pl1 ot ilerfor-
mance can be severe and deserves increased'emphasis. As will be discussed later, highly specialized 
control-movement techniques are required for deep stall recoveries. . 
\ : .. ~ 
.?epar:ure from ,:ontrolZed flight. The ail'Oraf: ahaU be resistant to de~ar.:ure ~l'Ol'I ~O"!,:;l'OZi,,, i "'!i:;; to, 
?o~t-staZZ gyrations, and api~~. It is further stated that the pilot should be able to arrest any _ncom: 
manded motion by l1i,",?Z" control, although no definition is given of what constitutes "simple" control. ::' 
.:.idi :ion, .ldem-lette WlCll'ning "f approaoh to'deparrure 3haZZ oe provided. These requi rements must meet pil 01-
centered criteria, are difficult to quant,i,fr, and may differ widely in application to specific aircraft • 
.'iec:'aveZ'lJ from past-eta!Z gyrations a~ spins. These requirements state the following: (a) Preper 
rc:!ovel"J ~echniql«l 1'IUSl: be readi:y ascezotained by the pUot and simpZe and easy ',:0 appZy w.cier the motio~.c 
.. naounl:ezoed, (b) a single technique shaZZ·'provide prompt reoovery from an post-8l:aH :Jyratioyw aoz.:i 
::.taipienl: apins, (c) avoidance :,/' spin reversal or advetose-moae change shaH "lO"C .ie~er.c: "'I prqciae ::;::~c, 
..!('.ttl'OZ tirrri .. g 01' defZectior., (d.) safe an4 consistent recotlery and puZZouts shalZ -'~, acco",!,lisi:ea :.:i:~ 
::,);!o!pl:abte aantrol !orues, and (,,) recoveZ::J shouZd be 8psai.ti.ed in ';er"ll1 of !ItZG~.Jai;:e "Hi-tude :01,)8 :-:-
, , 
, .' 
? 
-.. 
. ' .... 
. . 
: 
, ,~,-, 
r.wnbel' of tums. These are.relatively new requirements and:although difficult to design into an aircraft. 
cou 1 d provi de needed fl1 ght sa f,~ty improvements. 
.. 
... ' . 
,:' .' 
2.2 Identification of Pilot Human Factors Related to Stall/Spin 
In recent years, increased emphasis has been given to develop fighter aircraft specifically tailored 
to maneuver at very high AOA. The manufacturers and test agencies have gone to great lengths to provide 
aircraft which can be flown safely over a wide AOA and sideslip range. In spite of best efforts, accident 
records show that operational pilots can lose control during aggressive maneuvering. In a very comprehen-
sive survey of operational commands and squadrons (Ref. 2), it was noted that although high AOA maneuvering 
in combat was not considered a primary tactic, it should not limit the use of the aircraft. A digest of 
pilots' comments on high AOA flying characteristies obtained from operational units of fighter squadrons is 
given in Table 1. Without going into detail for each aircraft, in general, the pilots were satisfied with 
the departure characteristics but not the warning cues inherent in many of these supersonic fighter designs • 
TABLE 1. DIGEST OF PILOT COMMENTS ON SUPERSONIC FIGHTER AIRCRAFT 
HIGH-ADA FLYING CHARACTERISTICS (from Ref. 2) 
A 1 OA F Q Departure C . ircraft Overal high A •• characteristics ues 
F-4C,D,E Acceptable to good for Strong adverse yaw ~: Buffet (poor, 
F-4E (Leading 
edge 
slat) 
F-SE 
F-14A 
F-l5A 
F-l6A 
fighter Abrupt nose early, heavy) 
Departure hazard for slice/roll SticklPosition 
ground attack V: Stick,lforce Predictable-
Good control repeatable Dig-in 
effectiveness Recoverable (ff Opt. turn: Aircraft 
Must change control sufficient altitude buzz 
technique to rudder 
maneuvering 
Excellent 
Better separation 
between CLmax and 
departure a 
Less roll rate 
capabl1 ley 
Use all eron and 
rudder to roll 
Excellent 
Can point aircraft at 
very low speeds 
Never worry about a 
Loose aileron roll 
power - must use 
rudder maneuvering 
Good - "honest" 
High control power 
Rl'!qu ire s rudder,; 
maneuvering . 
Excellent 
Reduced adverse yaw 
Departure resistant 
Roll departure 
a: Buffet (good, 
steady increase) 
Aural·tone 
Stick position 
Somewhat unpredictable V: Buffet increase 
at very high a Stick force 
Recovers quickly 
Departure resistant 
Rudder induced high 
yaw rate 
Difficult to recover 
Adverse aileron yaw 
Departure resistant 
Yaw/roll departure 
Severity is speed 
dependent 
Departure resistant 
Nose sl1ce 
Opt. turn: Aircraft 
buzz 
a: Buffet; stick 
posi ~ion 
V: Flap horn 
Opt. turn: Buffet 
.; 
Genera lli poor 
Buffet 
Stick position 
Stick force 
High longitudinal 
control power Recover hands off 
Some worry about over-g Auto roll if inverted 
':1: Mild wing rock 
decreasing roll 
power nose drop 
at stall 
Opt. turn: Light 
buffet SRI makes airplane con-
sistent and repeatable 
Can override SRI 
Excellent maneuvering 
Maneuver with abandon: 
no worry about g or 
departure 
Tendency to excessive 
use of high a because 
of poor cues 
Lim; ters "take' over 
control," save poorly 
skilled pilot, restrict 
highly skilled pilot 
r,' 
Departure preventing 
system 
Can be tricked into 
Lat/Dir departure 
g-overshoot 
Super stall 
Automatic anti-spin 
system 
Recovery sometimes 
difficult 
None 
No stick cues 
No buffet 
No artifical cues 
Other 
Force harmony prOblems 
at low dynamic pressure 
Can over-rotate or 
over-g 
Roll SAS turned off 
Roll SAS turned off 
No roll rate CAS 
Full aft stick - max :I 
Centerline stores 
degrade stability 
significantly 
Main problem with 
asymmetric thrust 
PCAS turned off at 
high a 
Constant Fs/g. 10ngi-
tudi na I CAS 
PCAS turned off at 
high :I 
SRI provides all sticK 
maneuvers 
pa - dr causes 
inverted auto roll 
Constant Fs/n:: CAS 
SRI provides a1'l stick 
maneuvering 
~aneuver limits on n, 
il, p 
Need limit changes wit~ 
stores 
tue 
Buffet 
Airframe 
vibration 
Unconmanded 
motion ' 
Stick force 
Stick 
displactement 
Anqle of 
attack gauge 
Aural 
t , 
~ .. :.. .. :.~ .. ~. 
Considerations 
Normally natural cues 
'Useful head-up 
Shou,ld be gradually: i~creaSing with angle of attack 
. May ,interfere with AcH tracking if too :severe 
'-C~,; be implemented ~~t1ffCiallY - stick shaker 
Possible to confuse stall buffet with flap or Mach buffet 
Useful head-up or do~ 
Not eas 11y desi gned-.i n - may be very subtl e or very promi nent , 
Can be masked by turbulence " 
May be in the form of wing rock, porpo{sing, pitch-up, g-break. adverse yaw. etc. 
May interfere with t~acking or create hazard if at low altitud~ 
May involve a change;,i,; technique, e~g., 'feet-on-floor to stick-and-rudder to rudder only 
Usually more associated with lAS or, in some case, nz 
Useful head-up • " 
I";"! 
Can be implemented artificially - ~-beno~s, stick push,er 
Can be in various forms - stick lightening, control "mushiness"" 
11',' .'. 
loss of effectiveness, etc. 
Relates remaining control authority::' " . " 
Useful for indicating 't~im condition (if 'parallel trim involved) 
Normally artificial cues 
Direct indication of arigle of attack; .-
Direct scan required whether on panel:o~:~n HUD , 
Angle-of-attack Signal' can be au~nte(to account for rate of onset - add <i or 
Other gages u$ed as indirect indlcator~,of angle of attack - trim position. IAS 
:. ',' • " .; I • ~ 
Conmonly used in artit'1c'1al war,ning s>"stems ' 
May be difficult f~r pHot to a~Slmila'~e :,1n presence' of other aural cues ,or informa,tion 
More useful if a graduation In tone " 
Natural aural cues arel'alsO conmonly u;ed:'in supporting role~ - wing noise relates to lAS or 
noise level used to distinguish Mach buffet from stall buffet 
, , 
,'" ... r.,' 
Awarenes' of Okt-of-cont~l situations. Pilots may',have difficulty in determining if an out-of-
control situation is indeed a spin and, if so, whether it is upright or inverted. As noted in a recent 
Navy, spin, training instruction manual ~ . ''' .... the d1sor.1enting and phYSiological debil1tatlng effects of 
SUdden; unexpected. and often violent 'aircraft departure:are at best confusing and at worst fatal •.. " 
Many pilots lack confidence to fly to high AOA limits be~ause of uncertainty of proper analYSis of aircraft 
motions. Clearly, the out-of~control modes are more complex in modern aircraft and pilots may not have 
received. training to recognize all modes. ",," 
A flat. upright spin Oil modern fig~t~rs can feel 'sa:~hat similar to an inverted spin because of the 
large eyeballs-out (EBO) translational acceleration. The pilot must look at several sensor inputs to 
determine the spin mode. If the turn needle is pegged, AOA is at the upper limit. and the airspeed is 
low. then, the airc:r'aft is in an upr,ight spin. The p1l0t'jilust make a proper judgment when the turn ne'edle 
and ADA are pegged. but airspeed is greater than 200 knotS. In this case the aircraft is ~t in a spin 
but'in a tight-turn spiral. ; ,: 
~' , . '... . 
, a,e cf ';:Ol'1'Bct spin-I'ecovery tecllni.que. The primary, human factors problem in spin recovery is that 
the pilot is called, upon to provide unusual control inputs that are not part of his normal reflex action. 
He rnust be prepared beforehand psychologically and phySiologically by repeatedly ,fantasizing the correct 
control procedures in order to perform satisfactorily i~ a high stress situation., ' 
'.:," ".'" 
Once a recognized spin has started, pilot workload d ses rapidly and confusio'n' can set in, even undf:r 
training conditions. As discussed in Ref. 4. a marked'reduction in mental capacity of reception occurs end 
only one 'source of sensory information may be perceived,and used effectively. Eacn aircraft requires 
, "':' 4' , 
,1.: 
.' 
" ' ...
., 
" 
.. 
· . 
" 
: 
specific pilot control actions that must be accomplished quickly to minimize yaw rate buildup: Under 
stress the brain tends to accept only one,input at a'time '(see Ref. 5), and decisionmaking processes may 
degrade. The pilot must select the correct control input to effect recovery and relegate other items (adjustment of engine 'power, trim, selection of augmentation system switches, etc.) to re~lex action. 
Timing of control inputs and holding the controls at the fUZZ deflection for 'a sufficient period of 
time is necessary. As noted in Ref. 4, the ability to control multiple muscular actions may decrease and 
the pilot would be unaware that the stick has drifted away from the full anti-spin position. 
It has been established (Ref. 4) that one's internal chronometer changes under stress, such that judgment of time becomes inaccurate. In one case, the pilot reported that he had snapped the controls to 
the recovery position smoothly in 1 sec, while the telemetered data showed it took 5 sec and tliat the 
action was jerky. This action indicated that time had been shrunk by ,a factor of 5. In another case the 
pilot bitterly reported that the aircraft was extremely unresponsive to his recovery inputs even after 
holding anti-spin control positions for 20 sec. The time history records showed that recovery had 
occurred in 4 sec, thus indicating that time had appeared to ~ by a factor of 5. Put another way, 
the pilot thinks he has held anti-spin controls in for a period of 20,sec (required by several aircraft 
with large inertias) when, in fact, he has applied the controls for only 4 sec. 
I 
Another complicating factor is that the pilot must recognize and'anticipate spin recovery to apply 
correct control movement to avoid a secondary spin. It is important that the pilot uses correct sensory 
feedback to determine if recovery from the spin is imminent. In addition, he must possess "fluid intel-
ligence" to be able to quickly change the recovery process in the event that a modification in technique 
is required. 
RecentlY, there has been increased use of visual displays to aid the pilot in determining correct 
anti-spin control procedures. These visual inputs must be used with caution. Studies have shown (see 
Ref. 6) that vestibulo-ocular disorientation can occur in prolonged spins. Results show that in the roll 
plane of the skull there is limited capability for optokinetic following. , Consequently, misleading ves-
tibular signals arising from prolonged rotation drive an inappropriate oculomotor response. Pilots have 
reported that with high yaw~rate sp1ns (lBOo/sec), a "wagon wheel" effect can occur, where the large black 
squares (earth reference) and card1nal headings on the HUD appear to move in a d1rection contrary to that 
of the spin. Addit10nal research 1s needed in this area. 
Effeat of high rotation rates on rBaovBry. As indicated earlier, the design of modern fighters tends 
to place the p110t farther' forward from the C.G., subjecting the pilot to relatively large longitudinal 
accelerations in high yaw-rate spins. These forces cause addit10nal pilot anxiety because of concern for 
escape which may take number one priority in the pilot's mind and cause inappropriate control recovery 
action. In addit10n, records show that under high accelerations full right lateral control input is very 
difficult to maintain (see Ref. 4). In fact, some cockp1t restraint systems may allow the pilot to be 
displaced, such that correct control pos1t10ns for ,recovery may not be phys1010g1cally possible. ' 
Finally, the high' EBO 'accelerat10n tends to pool the blood at the' extremit1es, making it very painful 
to exert appreCiable forces on the controls. The predom1na.t1ng factor in d1 scuss ions' w1 th pl10ts on spi n-
recovery techniques is to keep it simpZe. The ideal recovery technique from the pilot's standpoint is to 
neutralize or release all controls - a simple reflex action which is easy to carry out, particularly during 
high accelerations. 
JudamBnt of performanae (attitude) margins. Another human factors problem may occur when it is neces-
sary to 1eave an aircraft after an irrecoverable out-of-control situation has developed. Modern fighter 
deSigns tend to have high descent rates and may require a relatively lerge number of turns (B-10) for spin 
recovery. In addition, there can be excessive alt1tude loss in recovery, after the spin is stopped. The 
foregoing factors may be difficult for the pilot to judge accurately and unless he is preprogrammed and 
strongly motivated to initiate ejection at a set altitude, there is a great tendency to delay ejection. 
Part of the problem, particularly with test pilots, is pride: loss of the test aircraft can ruin the total 
program. In training missions, the motivation to stay with the a1rcraft is also strong: the student pilot 
'wants to recover for fear of los1ng pOints with the instructor pilot. Equally catastrophic is when the 
instructor pilot has allowed the student pilot to go too far and must save face by coming home with the 
aircraft. Finally, because the forces and accelerations have sh1fted the pilot'S position away from an 
idealized eject10n po~ture, the p110t may delay ejection hop1ng t~ ach1eve a more 'favorable body position. 
3. DISCUSSION 
3.1 Results for Specif1c A1rcraft 
Several of the pilot human factors problems previously discussed are reviewed for'specif1c aircraft 
in this section. 
High AOA J1ight ah~ateristias for F-14A. This a1rcraft illustrates spin-recovery problems when the 
pilot Is placed far forward (22 ft) from the C.G. As noted in'the pilot's flight manual, In the cruise (clean) configuration the aircraft does not exhib1t a claSSic aerodynamic stall (g break) and to the pilot 
no stall is perceptible. Lift curve characteristics shown in Fig. 1 indicate that a directional divergence 
and roll reversal start to occur slightly above 15° AOA. Buffet starts at 14°, increasing to moderate at 
17°, and then decreases to light buffet at 24° AOA (not considered satisfactory stall warning~ see Ref. Z). 
Aircraft response to pilot control inputs becomes more difficult to predict above 20° AOA. Pitching 
moment due to sideslip changes magn1tude and Sign as AOA is increased. Excessive or prolonged use of lat-
eral stick deflection can cause departure and recovery from high ADA flight requires the pilot to use rudder 
alone. Sink rate may increase to gOOD ft/min and loss of 5000 ft altitude is typical in recovery from high 
AOA flight. --.. " ' 
10 
. " 
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Fig. 1. F-14A trimmed lift curve (f~om Ref. 2). 
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'H 
, ". In the takeoff/landi'ng configuration, at 28° AOA, 
,the stall is characterized by divergent wing rock and 
. yaw excursions. Yaw angles may reach 25° and roll 
angles 90° within 6 sec if the st1ck is held back. If 
.. <.the stall condition is momentarily nC'1etrated, 1000 ft 
of altitude is required for recovery. The stall warn-
ing and stalling characteristics of the F-14A Jre 
typ~cal of high-performance fighter aircraft. One 
can 'appreciate the need for a good pilot 1ndoctrina-
t1on.'to fly this type of aircraft at high AOA. 
'Although the F-14A is basically departure resis-
tant, departures can occur during maneuvers combining 
rolling with high AOA. Departure is described as a 
snap' roll, or a series of snap rolls, opposite to the 
direction of desired turn or lateral stick input. 
Since the departure 1s triggered by adverse s1deslip 
'generated by the differential rolling tail, using 
stick opposite to the direction of roll will aggravate 
departure. ' 
Departure recovery requires precise control positioning and timing. The pilot's flight manual states 
that pilots should neutral1ze rudders and lateral stick.'and push st1ck forward slowly to tr1m position or 
slightly forward of trim, tO,reduce AOA to 17 units or less. Pushing stick forward rapidly dur1ng a 
departure can result In Increasingly oscillatory pitch and,roll motions. If recovery is not eminent. lat-
eral stick must be moved slowly in the direction of roll and yaw and rudders must be moved in the opposite 
direction. When roll/yaw stops, pi10ts should immedl~.tely neutralize lateral control and rudders. 
The foregoing departure recovery procedures illustrate the need for precise, well-timed control ~ove­
ments to prevent further deterioration from controlled'flight. As noted previously, in a high stress sit-
uation, the'pilot's ability to control; multiple muscular actions may decrease, particularly when exposed 
to strong forces (discussed next).:" " ' " 
'. "1 
It is important that the pilot appreciates the'need t~ effect recovery quickly before yaw rate builds 
up. Because the cockpit is located 22.ft ahead of the,C.G., large longitudinal dccelerations occur with 
an increase in yaw rate, as shown in Fig;· 2 (from Ref. 7).; Centrifuge tests of the F-14A configurat10n 
showed the following: 
.;. 8 0 F·14A IX FLIGHT 
~ DATA 
~ 
'a: ~6 
1M 
H 
«( 
.. 
~4 g 
l-
S 
~2 
.. 
I-
,e;: 
.. 
u 
80 40 80 120 
YAW RATE. deg/sec 
180 200 
fig. 2. Variation'of acceleration with yaw rate (F-14A: from Ref. 7). 
j" , 
, ' .:1. At -3 9 EBO" the pi I ot coul d operate fl1 ght 
contrals but could not reach the overhead ejection 
handle. . 
,'1.'2. At -5.5 g EBO, the pilot could think and see 
but could not move the flight controls, due to pain 
ca~sed by blood pooling in extremities. 
, '. 
: ,',In add1tion to the longitudinal EBO forces, large 
cockp1.t lateral accelerations ;can build up when 'a 
rapid.onset of yaw rate induces a large sideslip angle (Shown in Fig. 3). Recovery procedures may be diffi-
cult to accomplish because of the inadequacy of the 
lateral-seat restraint system. In fact, the pilot can 
be:displaced sideways such that his helmet Is against 
the canopy and he may not be able to reach the engine 
controls. 
' .... ' .. 
.' ,Part of the problem for twin engine aircraft is 
that the pilot nas difficult(,in determining engine 
power:~tatus during departures and spins. Currently 
used ~ngine sensors require too much analyzing by t~e 
pilot to determine to what degree engine thrust asym-
metry'has occurred. Th1s adds appreciably to the 
pilot~s workload during a high stress situation. 
. ~ . ~. 
, AS noted in Ref. 7, "For a' test pilot who pur-
posely:causes the aircraft to depart, knows 'Nnich 
direction it will go, has a yaw rate gage, and has 
pract1ced the maneuver on the simulator, recovery from 
this m,aneuver was possible. For the fleet pilot wno 
encounters this departure unexpectedly, recovery 
would not be certain." 
2 ... [_____ "- ~;,~; : ~limning up for the F-14A, although the aircraft 
°L[_..I'_ ...... ,_~..J.._..L::::::::,:_-:~,::::,:~, is biad, sflltCal hlY spin resdisbtant, a nufmbier of stall/spin 
-2Ci 8 12 18 20 3S ace e save occure ecause ,0 nherent pl10t 
4 SECONDS 24 28 32 l1mitat10ns in analyzing the out-of-control mode and 
.t, ' 
Fig. 3. Cockpit lateral accelerat10n at h,gh yaw 
rate (F-14A; from Ref. 7). , 
!' 
apply1ng correct anti-departure/spin-control proce-
dures. 'Because the pilot is so vulnerable to the 
deb11itating centrifugal acceleration effects, thIs 
aircra~t would have greatly benefited from an auto-
matic ,s~in prevention system. '> 
'. 
.' 
: 
High'AOA CharactB~8tic8 lor F-16A/B. This aircraft 11iu~trates the' need for unusual.stall-recovery 
techniques by the pilot. It is noteworthy that no spin accidents have occurred for this aIrcraft. It has 
been made spin resistant by using a system that detects a threshold yaw rate and automatically applies 
ailerons with the spin and rudder against the spin. ' " 
The lift character1st1cs of th1s conf1gurat1on 
show an initial break in lift curve slope at 20° AOA, 
resulting from outer wing panel stall (Fig. 4). The 
highly swept wing-body strake continues to increase 
11ft up to a CLmax at 35° AOA (Ref. 8). The 
pitching-moment characteristics associated with 
these lift characteristics are shown in Fig. 5 (obtained from Ref. 8). Note that mild pitch statiC 
instability,occurs in the lower ADA range for the 
nominal C.G. position of 0.35 c and that a stable 
trim point exists in the high AOA range at approxi-
mately 60°. An important pOint of interest is that 
relatively low pitCh-control power exists to retrim 
the aircraft to a lower AOA value. Because the 
aircraft could be flown to very high AOA where 
departures may occur, the AOA is limited art1fi-
cially to values below 25° by automatically apply-
ing nose-down stabilizer control. The effective-, 
ness of this technique is limited by the nose-down 
pitch-control power available. For aircraft which 
emplo~ relaxed stat1c stability (RSS) (such as the 
F-16A), suffic1ent nose-down pitch control is 
basically difficult to obtain. Thus, even w1th 
an alpha limiter employed, an operational pilot in 
ACM can depart the aircraft; several accidents 
have resulted from the deep stall hang-ups. 
An exce 11 ent di scuss i on of the mechani cs of 
departure for fighter aircraft with relaxed static 
stability is given in Ref. 8., The alpha limiter 
can be defeated if the pilot uses high roll rates 
where sufficient nose-up 1nert1a coupling moments 
are generated to overpower the available nose-
down control moment. The available full nose-
down moment could also be used in recovery from 
prolonged vert1cal climbs to zero airspeed where 
high AOA conditions result during the fall-through 
phase. Thus, the alpha lfmiter can be "fooled" 
with normal evasive maneuvering by operational 
pilots, resulting in a deep stall condition. As 
noted later, this can be very perplexing for the 
pilot because of the unusual control inputs 
required and the lack of previous exposure. 
The flight manual for the F-16A/B aircraft 
discusses the out-of-control recovery procedures, 
illustrating pertinent pilot human factors prob-
le'ms. The upright deep stall is characterized by 
a 1-g load factor, an AOA pegged at 32°, and an 
airsoeed reading between SO and 150 knots. With 
rearward C.G. locations, the deep stall 1s oscil-
latory in pitch, and the AOA may vary :30· with 
some roll oscillations. Oscillatory deep stalls 
can be deceptive because the nose may drop below 
the horizon, giving the appearance of self- ' 
recovery. As noted 1n Ref. 9. the deep-stall 
ride qualities are unique in that the aircraft is 
very quiet. with gentle buffet and no apparent 
forward motion. The pilot must not be lulled 
into a complacent attitude, however, since the 
sink rate is approximately 400 ft/sec and many of 
the deep stall situations have occurred during 
low-altitude maneuvering. 
'~ 
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various stabilator deflections (F-16A configuration; 
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The recovery procedures from the deep stall 
are certainly not classic and demand a well-
disciplined approach. Because the aircraft 15 
locked into the high AOA trim point by a stable 
pitch stability Situation, full nose-down stabilizer deflection will not overcome the basic stability; how-
ever, the aircraft can be "rocked" out of the deep stall. This is done by USing the total available pitch-
ing moment control, full nose down to full nose up (Fig. 5) in phase with the residual pitch oscillatory 
motions. The pilot must (1) hold the manual pitch overr1de (MPO) switch in override (OVRD), giving the 
pilot full tail travel; (2) extend the speed brakes; and (3) select the AFT (Fuel) FEED mode. Since most 
deep stalls are oscillatory in roll and yaw also, it may be difficult 'for the pilot to ascertain 'a change 
in pitch attitude with the aircraft banked. The 1nstructions note that if no increase in attitude is dis-
cerned (with full pitch control), the pilot should wait 3,sec and apply full reverse control. If the,nose 
'does not continue down with full forward stick, but reverses and starts up, full back stick must be applied 
7 
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to continue rocRfng'the aircraft; The pitch oscillation has a period of approximately 3 sec and the pilot 
is warned that rapid cycling of;the control will be ineffective. The foregoing deep-stall recovery pro- I 
cedure, although,effective in principle. requires.good'tlming and patience frem the pilot. Although the 
recovery method is not dlfflcult~physiologlcally to;carry out, the unusual control Inputs required may 
cause some pl10ts ,to 'give up. Exposure to this 's1tuation can obviously improve pilot Fi.riciency and con-
fidence. The' abil Hy to achieve', success i on the first, try is not good; 75:: of vi si ting European F-16 pil ots 
failed when tested: in a two-place F-16 a1rcraft. 'Fu~ther, as noted in Ref.:10. the use of an MPO switch 
may have questionable operational, util1ty: "The MPO was an effective upright deep stall recovery device 
when utilized properly ••• However, the ability of the operational pilot to properly and readily adapt 
to the usage of, the MPO remains a ,concern. , During flight tests with pilots who were extremely familiar 
with the deep stall environment,:as many ,as four total cycles of the stick were required before an effec-
tive cycle was achieved. The primary difficulty encountered involved improper phasing with existing pitch 
oscillations. ,'Proper phasing became much more difficult when severe roll oscillations existed. The roll-
ing tendency (to as much as 90° bank angle) masked the:pitching motion of the aircraft." 
In sUlll11ary'; RSS used on f1gh~~r aircraft can 'result 1n pilot control problems at high AOA due to deep-
stall trim. ,The pilot must provide a properly phased pitch-control oscillation technique (which violates 
the simpZe rule) to effect recovery during a period of:high psychological stress. 
, ResuZta ~o; PIA-t8A. This aircraft is used to ex~plifY potential problems for the pilot when advanced 
flight-control systems are used to provide departure/spin resistance and automatic spin recovery. 'A pri-
mary design goal was to provide the operational pilot with an unrestricted maneuvering capability (no AOA 
limiter used) in the high AOA range; The F/A-1BA incorporates a highly sophisticated, full-authority, 
digital flight-control system programmed to enhance high AOA flight characteristics. As noted in Ref. 11, 
departure/spin resistance is obtained by scheduling the maneuvering flaps (both leading- and trailing-edge 
,flaps) with AOA Mach number and by reducing differential tail and aileron authority at high AOA to reduce 
adverse yaw. An aileron rudder interconnect,(ARIl-like feature provides a favorable (proverse) yaw contribu-
tion to improve roll coordination., ,A rudder pedal to roll interconnect reduces proverse yaw during rudder-
only rolls. The 1'011 control systems minimize kinemat~c'coupling (the interchange of AOA and sideslip) oy 
rolling about the stability axis. :Roll-to-pftch,feedbacks are used to reduce 'inertia-coupling effec~s. 
These features, some of which are unique to the F/A-IBA~ will be corrmon to future aircraft designs to pro-
duce'roll about the velocity vector:', and hence reduce, sideslip in high AOA ma'neuvers without sacrificing 
maneuverabilfty. As noted in Ref. :2.",this could result'fn more yaw than roll .. at high AOA, and pilots may 
'experience difficulty in detecting ,nose slice departure. In piloted sfmulator:tests, application of 
recovery control was too late to prevent departure. An' automatic spin-recovery mode logic was designed 
into ~he control system to establis~;yaw-rate engagement thresholds which were nat so low as to reduce 
departure/spin resistance. but not ';so,high as to prevent recovery from a spin. 
~ . " .' 
_ ,Unfortunately, during initial operational test ,anci:evaluation on Nov. 14,'19BO. the first unintentional 
F-1BA out-of-control experience happened to an operational pilot. The departure occurred during yo-yo 
maneuvers at about 20,000 ft. Although the pilot applfed correct anti-spin-control inputs, recovery could 
not b~ obtained, and the pilot ejected safely below 10;000 ft. The facts that the departure occurred so 
easily and was apparently impossible to recover from fu~ther illustrate pilot problems when confrontea with 
an unexpected out-of-control situati,on. ",:,::: ' 
,Looking first to examine whethe~'the pilot had ad~uate warning of the approach to departure: it is 
noted (Ref. 11) that as AOA is increased beyond 10°. a',lI!'!dium-frequency, low-amplftude buffet can ,be felt 
by the pilot. Further increases in AOA result in increased airframe buffet with decreased frequency. how-
ever, these changes are subtle. spreid'out over a wfde AOA range, and generally do not serve as an adequate 
AOA indication. As AOA exceeds 50° to'SO° the pilot can hear a loud recurring noise associated with the 
'shed vortex from the leading-edge extension (LEX). this,noise is not effective for warning because it 
occurs at an AOA too far above AOA for' CLmax (35° to,40,O). Because the aircraft has weak natural warning 
cues, artificial AOA cues are provided ,through computerS~ The various 'artificial cues provided by the AIJA 
feedback 'loops are shown in Fig. 6 (from Ref. 11). 'The'most sfgnificant of these cues may be in the pitch 
contrOl. where above 15° AOA much larger pull stick forces are required. As 35° AOA is reached, most 
pilots use two hands on the stick, which should serve as,a very effective cue for out-of-the-cockpit 
flying, """ 
. " . ," ~ 
Look.ing next at the spin characteristics of the FiA:-18A aircraft, as des'cribed in Ref. 12, it was 
noted by the pilot in the Nov. 19BO accident that the spin yaw rate was ve~ low; In fact. so low as found 
, in.subsequent investigations to prevent automatic 
engagement of the spin recovery mode (which provides 1--------... ful,1 control authority). This low yaw-rate spin mace 
HIGH Q ' was: not predicted by model tests. Thus, the, fli ght 
WARNING TONE control system (FCS) remained in' the limited-authority 
command augmentation (CAS) mode, and the pilot was ' 
lef~ with low anti-spin yaw control cower. This 
factor must have been very perplexing to the opera-
tio~al pilot, since previous flight testing had shown 
th~.aircraft to be extremely difficult to depart, 
nearly Impossible to spin, and rapid in spin recovery, 
Subsequent flight spin tests revealed three spin 
modes. not always ,distinct (Ref. 11). A low yaw rate. 
less than SOo/sec, relatively smooth with some pitch 
and:ro 11 tendenci es and a rate of descent of 
" ~ I ... ----+I---------·.oil~ :::: ' 
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spin (110o/sec to I40 o/sec) occurred at AOA,up to 95°, and'was smooth and flat with only small'oscillations. 
Unlike the other modes. EBO accelerations become uncomfortable (but not disorienting). -3.5 g maximum. with 
recovery in I ess than three turns. ." r' ' , " 
Looking further at out-of-control modes which may, have confronted the pilot in the :~~O accident, 
flight tests identified what was termed an AOA hang-up in low-speed flight with rear C.G. loadings. This 
condition was encountered from near-vertical, low-speed stalls or occasionally following spin recovery. 
In the AOA range of 45° to 55°, the pilot experiences a very slow nose-down, pitch recovery ~ith full for-
ward stick. As noted in Ref. 13, "Time to recover was excessive and loss of altitude could eXl,;eed 8000 ft. 
Recovery was achi eved with full forward sti ck and extreme ,patience • ' •• " 
Another variation of this AOA hang-up was termed a "falling leaf maneuver" because of the ,oscillations 
in sideslip, roll rate, and pitch rate which occur during descent. The magnitude of the oscillations 
shown in the time history data of Fig. 7 WOLuld cause additional anxiety for the pilot because of the 
excessive time required for pitch down and the large altitude loss. In addition. lateral control appeared 
to be ineffective in damping the roll oscillations. As noted in Ref. 13,this oscillatory falling-leaf 
mode was the most probable cause of the 1980 accident. 
Whenever extreme patience is demanded from the pilot tO'effect recovery, pilot response patterns are 
difficult to predict. As discussed p~viously, judgment of time during periods of high stress can be 
seriously inaccurate. Because the pilot is not aware of this infirmity. given the option, ejection might 
appear to be the only solution. 
To deal with the foregoing type of departure problems, an improved automatic spin mode logic was 
incorporated. A unique feature of this system is that it provides full anti-spin control authority only 
if the pilot moves the lateral stick in the correct direction (with the spin). If the pilot applies pro-
spin stick, the digital flight control system (DFCS) reverts back to the CAS mode which, in effect. negates 
his input. ' 
The use of direct command signals to aid the pilot in out-of-control situations has merit, since as 
,noted previously, under high stress condftfons the mind tends to perceive and use only one channel or 
source of information. Equally effectfve might be a voice command, based on a model-following system and 
software logiC which analyzes the state of the aircraft's motions and verbally instructs the,pilot as to 
the correct control positions for recovery. 
Another example where the pilot was expos~d to large lateral side forces occurred during departure 
tests at medium AOA when aggravated (pro-spin) :controls were applied (see Ref. 13). As shown in Fig. 8, 
extremely high side forces (up to 3 g later4l1y) were associated with the very large sideslip angles (over 
75°) that occurred in this high subsonic (M • 0.9) departure. As previously discussed for the F-14A air-
craft, the pilot is at an extreme disadvantage~to provide precise control positioning to effect recovery. 
Fortunately, in this case recovery was readily accomplished with neutral controls. It would be prudent to 
protect the operational p1,l~t from this type of flightpath divergence with suitable control law logiC. 
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In summary, the F/A-18A aircraft represents an advanced high-performance fighter aircraft providing 
the pilot with.unrestricted maneuvering capability at.hfgh AOA. Although some unique and unexpected high 
AOA problems were encountered in early testing. because of improvements made in the FCS logic it would be 
expected that fewer stall/spin acc1dents due to pilot error wfll occur durfng the operational lffe of this 
type aircraft •. ;:::. . 
.... ;' 
, , 
5. CONCLUSIONS " ,: 
A review of pflot human factors related to stall/spin accidents of supersonic fighter aircraft indi-
cates the following: 
1: To improve the stall/spin' accident record, a better understanding fs needed of fundamental human 
factors whfch lfmit the operational pilot's abflity to perform sat1sfactorily in the high stress environ-
ment associated with air combat maneuvering at very high AOA. 
2. The primary human factors problem Is that the pilot is called upon to provide unusual control 
functions that are·not part of hfs normal reflex action in an environment where his psycho-physiological 
processes are degraded. ' 
3. Several serious psycho-pnysiologfcal phenomena'fnfluencfng the pflot's behavior in stall/spin 
situations include: (1) channelization of sensory·fnputs (one thought at a time); (2) limitations in pre-
Cisely controlling several muscular inputs; (3) inability to accurately judge passage of time; and (4) disorientation of vestfbulo-ocular inputs. 
4. Key h'uman factors related "items which influence the pilot's ability to operate successfully in 
the high AOA part of the flight envelope include (1) the need for tactile (nonvisual) warning cues to 
sense margins from out-of-control flight; (2) a means for quickly identifying out-of-control situations; (3) stall/spin recovery techniques which are simple for the pilot to execute; (4) an improved crew restraint 
system to alleviate'large translational forces in departures and spins; and (5) motivation schemes to 
facilitate timely ejection. ' 
5. Because the latest supersonic fighter aircraft, provide the pilot with greatly increased capability 
for high AOA maneuvering, departure/spin resistance and automatic spin prevention systems are needed to 
provide additional protection from but-of-control flight. These systems, including the use of graphic dis-
plays and voice command ,information"for departure/spin recovery assistance, and improved engine-status 
information for twin engine aircraft, will undoubtedly improve the stall/spin accident record; however, 
more operational experience is needed to optimize these concepts for the fighter pilot with an acceptable 
reduction in maneuverability and minimum increase in,aircraft cost and complexity. 
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